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1 Introduction
In social choice theory, we expect any collective decision within a group of individuals to
reect the preferences of its members over the feasible social alternatives. Since any in-
dividual is allowed to express freely his/her preference, it is however necessary to specify
which alternative will be selected for each conceivable prole of preferences. This mapping
is called hereafter a social choice mechanism. From a normative viewpoint, the concept is
well dened since, as long as preferences are the only individual characteristics which mat-
ter, the mechanism simply describes which alternative should be selected in any possible set
of circumstances. From a positive viewpoint, the mapping is truly a composed mapping,
as an institution is an object which can be far more complicated than a direct revelation
mechanism. An institution is described by a set of rules leading, from the perspective of
the analysis, to a normal form game. The key observation is that when we account for
equilibrium behavior in the setting describing that institution, we end up with a set of social
alternatives which only depends upon the prole of preferences. This means that under the
presumption that this set is nonempty and does not contain several alternatives, we can look
at the composed map (amalgating the institution and the equilibrium behavioral responses)
as a social choice mechanism.
In the context of a social choice mechanism, the strategic choice of an agent consists in
reporting his/her preferences over the alternatives. In this revelation game, like in any game,
the ultimate e¤ect of his/her choice will depend upon his report together with the reports of
the other individuals. There is no reason to assume that individuals will report the truth : if
an agent can secure a better alternative by announcing preferences di¤erent from the truth,
he/she may do so. These misreports can lead to a collective decision which has very little
to do with the one based on true preferences and may turn out to be quite unsatisfactory.
It becomes therefore important to identify which social choice mechanisms are immune to
such manipulations.
In this paper, we will focus on two notions describing the resistance of a social choice
mechanism to manipulations. The rst one is strategyproofness which is a very strong form
of robustness against "misbehavior". A social choice mechanism is strategyproof or individ-
ual strategyproof ( when we want to call the attention on the fact that only the behavior of
individuals is taken into consideration) if telling the truth is a dominant strategy for every
individual. This means that an individual does not need to solve the strategic uncertainty
(attached, in principle to any game) to know what is his/her best strategy : no matter what
the others do, a lie never pays out. This strong form of incentive compatibility is attractive
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but very demanding. In fact, an extremely dissapointing but fundamental result due to
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) states that if any preference can be reported, then
only dictatorial mechanisms are strategyproof. In this paper, we are going to investigate
the implication of strategyproofness for a class of environments where not every conceivable
preference can be reported by an individual. We assume that an individual can report a
preference from a prescribed subset of the set of all preferences, called the set of admissi-
ble preferences. Under that assumption of a restricted domain of preferences, the nihilist
conclusion of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem may disappear in the sense
that there exist non dictatorial strategyproof social choice mechanisms. In this paper, we
consider this general setting : for some domain of admissible preferences, strategyproofness
leads to a very narrow class of mechanisms while for some others, the class may contain very
satisfactory mechanisms. We dont touch the di¢ cult and open question of characterizing
the class of admissible domains of preferences leading to non dictatorial strategyproof social
choice mechanisms.
The second notion of resistance to manipulation that we consider aims to incorporate
the idea that besides individuals, groups (coalitions) of individuals may also play an active
role, not captured by the notion of strategyproofness. Precisely, we want to consider a notion
where the threats of coalitions are described and taken into consideration when designing the
social choice mechanism. The denition of coalitional strategyproofness that we consider in
this paper is the following. A social choice mechanism is coalitionally manipulable if for some
prole of preferences, there exist a coalition such that when their members jointly misreport
adequately their preferences, the mechanism selects an alternative that they all prefer to
the one that would result if all of them had reported their true preferences.A social choice
mechanism is coalitional strategyproof if it is never coalitionally manipulable. This denition
is the conventional1 denition of coalitional strategyproofness used in the literature.
The main purpose of this paper is to study under which conditions the properties of
(individual) strategyproofness and coalitional strategyproofness coincides. Strictly speaking,
if a social choice mechanism is coalitional strategyproof then it is strategyproof but the
converse does not need to hold true. Our main contribution is to identify a su¢ cient condition
on the domain of admissible preferences for this equivalence to hold true. We call rich
domains the domains satisfying this condition. Precisely, we show (theorem 1) that under
the richness condition at hand, strategyproofness is equivalent to modied strong positive
association (Barbera and Peleg (1990)), a condition that does not discriminate between
1It comes often under di¤erent names : coalition, coalitionally and group strategyproofness are among
the most spread.
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an individual and coalitional level. Now, by this equivalence, strategyproofness inherits this
indistinguishability between an individual and coalitional level. After introducing the formal
denition of richness, we examine through many di¤erent domains the exact nature of the
requirements which are needed for this property to hold. In particular while some exibility
is needed, we also show that it is logically independent of the free triple property2. In the
second part of the paper, we illustrate the interest of this result through the examination
of a specic social environment where the decision is on the allocation of a xed amount
of ressources (say a budget) between several public expenditures. We revisit an important
impossibility result due to Zhou (1991). The proof scheme suggested by theorem 1 goes as
follow. First, we prove that the domain under scrutiny is rich. Therefore, from theorem1,
the restriction of a strategyproof mechanism to any subdomain is coalitional strategyproof.
We select a subdomain, and exploit the geometry of the Pareto set over that subdomain
or (better) take advantage of what is known (existing results in the literature) to sort out
the implications of strategyproofness over that subdomain. Finally, go back to the original
domain through a top only property. Along thse lines we obtain an alternative proof of a
theorem slightly weaker than Zhousoriginal statement. We also show how to use this proof
scheme to deal with other domains not considered and covered by Zhou.
Related Literature
This paper is at the intersection of two branches of the literature. On one hand, we
study the role of the domain of admissible preferences on the properties of a social choice
mechanism satisfying some other conditions. On the other hand, we are mostly interested
by the denition and implications of coalitional incentive compatibility constraints in the
design of a social choice mechanism.
We are not the rst to pay attention to the role of the domain in the characterization
of strategyproof social choice mechanisms. As the Gibbard-Satterthwaites theorem makes
use of the universal domain condition, it was natural to investigate the responsability of
that assumption in the derivation of the result. It was also useful since (besides voting)
most environments of interest entail restricted preferences. This literature is nicely surveyed
in Barbera (2001) and Sprumont (1995). To the best of our knowledge, very few general
principles have been established and the research has consisted mostly in the detailed study
of the implications of strategyproofness in some classes of problems. It is worth mentionning
few of these general results. Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979) have introduced a
general domain richness condition that they use as a generalization of the universal domain
condition in the formulation of many results in the theory of implementation. In a general
2This question was raised by our referee.
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class of allocation environments (covering the cases with private components), Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (1997) have introduced the notion of strict monotonic closedness and demonstrate
that for such domains, strategyproofness, non-bossiness3 and equal treatment of equals im-
ply no-envy. For the same class of domains, Moulin (1993) demonstrates that coalitional
strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals imply also no-envy. He also notes that
coalition strategyproofness could be replaced by Maskin monotonicity which, as noted by
Fleurbaey and Maniquet is a stronger requirement than strategyproofness and non-bossiness
together, under the Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin richness condition. These domain rich-
ness conditions are logically unrelated to our richness domain condition. Given two proles
satisfying some properties, these conditions ask for the existence of a third prole satisfying
also some properties. In contrast, our condition asks that for any single prole satisfying
some properties, there exists a second prole satisfying some properties.
The strong form of coalitional incentive compatibility considered here has been incor-
porated by many authors in axiomatic social choice. For instance, Moulin, in many (e.g.
Moulin (1994), (1999)) of his works on axiomatic cost sharing, uses it as a key axiom. Of
course, the question of coalitional incentive compatibility raises many challenging problems
and have been formulated di¤erently by other authors. Within the general theory of im-
plementation, Maskin (1979) shows that the set of social choice mechanisms which can be
implemented in strong Nash equilibrium is much smaller than the set of those which are
simply Nash implementable. With the weaker concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium,
Bernheim andWhinston (1987) derives similar conclusions. Based on a di¤erential approach,
La¤ont and Maskin (1980) show the di¢ culty to conciliate strategyproofness and coalitional
incentives. This line of research follows some early work by Green and La¤ont (1979) empha-
sizing the impossibility of constructing Clarke-Groves mechanisms which are robust to the
formation of coalitions. They assume4 that side payments are possible among the members
of the coalition and that coalitions do not face informational issues. When coalitions are
confronted themselves to the issue of elicitating information about preferences, we open the
door to a class of new and di¢ cult problems where the games of side contracting have to be
properly dened. Cremer (1996) revisits the family of Clarke-Groves mechanisms from that
perpective and obtain few positive results. Several contributions in the traditional Bayesian
mechanism design approach have paid attention to coalitional considerations in di¤erent
settings ranging from auctions to general organizations. La¤ont and Martimort (1997) have
3This property was introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981). We dont dene it precisely :
it amounts to require that if by changing his report, an individual does not change his allocation, then he
does not change the allocation of somebody else.
4They call strongly coalition incentive compatible this class of Clarke-Groves mechanisms.
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characterized quite generally the class of social choice mechanisms which are immune to
coalitional side contracting in this Bayesian setting.
2 Denitions and Notations
In this section, we present the class of social choice environments which we consider and
we introduce the main denitions and notations which are going to be used throughout this
paper.
We are interested in a situation where a society (group) described by a nite set N =
f1; 2; ::::; ng of individuals must decide which alternative to select out of a set X of feasible
alternatives. Each individual i 2 N is described by his/her preference Ri over X, which
is assumed to be a complete preorder5. We will denote respectively by Pi and Ii the strict
preference and the indi¤erence relations induced by Ri. Sometimes, we will represent a
preference Ri by a utility function Ui, but the reader should keep in mind that, in our
framework, two utility functions representing the same preference will always be considered as
equivalent. A prole of preferences is a vector   (R1; R2; :::::; Rn) describing the preferences
of each individual in the society. If  is a prole of preferences and S  N is a nonempty
subset of individuals, then S denotes the subprole (Ri)i2S; when S = Nn fig for some
i 2 N , we denote  i for S. If  and 0 are two proles of preferences and S  N , then
00 

S; 
0
NnS

denotes the prole such that 00(i) = (i) if i 2 S and 00(i) = 0(i) if
i =2 S.
Denition 1 Let  be a subset of proles. A social choice mechanism with domain 
is a mapping C from  into X.
If  consists of all possibles proles, the domain is said to be universal. Otherwise, it is
said to be restricted. The notion of domain is central in our paper as the results are driven
by assumptions which will be formulated on the domain. We will limit our investigation to
Cartesian domains i.e. domains such that  =
nY
i=1
Di where for all i 2 N , Di is a nonempty
subset of complete preorders over X.
The social choice mechanism reects the aspirations and properties that this society
wants to take into account to proceed in selecting a social alternative. The input of such
mechanism is a prole of preferences. This means that once we know the diversity of opinions
in the society, conicts but also areas of agreement, we have, in principle, everything needed
to pick up a compromise. To operate, the mechanism needs this input, but in most cases,
5A preorder is a reexive and transitive binary relation.
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this input is not known or veriable with certainty by all members of the society. Confronted
with this di¢ culty, we could then consider a broader class of social choice mechanisms where
the domain would be now a Cartesian set M =
nY
i=1
Mi where for all i 2 N , Mi is an abstract
set of messages or reports that can be sent by individual i. As every individual is ultimately
interested by the social alternative that will be selected, such a mechanism together with
the prole  of preferences generates a normal form game among the individuals which are
assumed to be rational players : for each individual i, the choice of the message mi to be
sent, constitutes a strategic choice.
Using the apparatus of game theory, we can predict the equilibrium behavior of the
individuals and therefore the social outcome. In this paper, we focus on social choice mech-
anisms admitting equilibria in dominant strategies i.e. such that, for all prole  in the
domain , each individual i has a dominant strategy. It is well known6 that for such equi-
librium concept, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to the class of social
choice mechanisms introduced in denition 1 and to impose that the report of the truth is a
dominant strategy for every individual in every possible circumstance.
Denition 2 A social choice mechanism C with domain  is manipulable by individual
i at prole  if there exists R0i 2 Di such that C ( i; R0i)PiC(). A social choice mechanism
C with domain  is strategyproof if there is no individual i and no prole  2  such that
C is manipulable by i at .
This property reects the necessity to provide incentives to individuals to make sure
that they report the right information. Strategyproofness is a strong form of incentive
compatibility as it requires the existence of dominant strategies. From the perspective of
constructing the social choice mechanism, this property acts as a constraint in the design of
the rule.
Some fewmore denitions and notations are needed. From now on, we limit our attention7
to the case where Di  D for all i 2 N .8 Let D  [x2XDx where :
Dx  fR 2 D : xPy for all y 2 Xn fxgg
6This is the so called revelation principle (Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979). The reader may
consult Jackson (2001) for a nice overview of implementation theory.
7In what follows, we will often abusely use the expression domain for both  andD. Under this uniformity
assumption, we dont see any risk of confusion.
8This assumption implies that there are no intrinsic ex ante di¤erences among individuals and therefore
rules out social environments with private dimensions. Many results of the paper can be extended to
frameworks where this uniformity assumption is weakened. Note however that, in its current form, the
modied strong positive association property cannot accomodate the structural indi¤erences attached to a
domain with private components.
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Dx is the set of preferences for which the alternative x is uniquely best. Finally, let
X  fx 2 X such that Dx 6= ?g: an alternative x is in X if there exists an admissible
preference with x on top. Let C be the restriction of C to the subdomain   (D)n.
The following result will be used in some proofs. Let :
C()  fx 2 X : x = C() for some  2 g
be the range of the mechanism C.
Lemma 1 Let C be a strategyproof social choice mechanism with domain D. For all
 2 Dn and all x 2 C(), if Ri 2 Dx for all i 2 N , then C() = x.
Denition 3 A social choice mechanism C with domain  is regular if C()  X.
To the best of our knowledge, this property is new. It requires that the range of the
mechanism is contained in the subset of alternatives which appear on the top of an admissible
preference. It is certainly controversial in any environment where an alternative which could
be considered as a good social compromise is disregarded simply because at best, it appears
on second position in any individual preference9. In most of this paper, we will consider
environments where the property of regularity does not raise any problem. The following
simple lemma will be useful.
Lemma 2 Let C be a strategyproof and regular social choice mechanism with domain D.
Then, C() = C().
Proof : Since C()  C(), we are left to prove that C()  C(). Let x 2 C().
Since C is regular, x 2 X. Let  2 Dn be such that Ri 2 Dx for all i 2 N . By lemma 1,
x = C() = C() and hence x 2 C() 
The property described in the following denition has been introduced by Barbera et
Peleg (1990).
Denition 4 A social choice mechanism C with domain Dn satises the modied strong
positive association10 property if for all  2 Dn, all i 2 N and all x 2 C(), if C() = x
and R0i 2 D is such that xP 0iy for all y 2 C()n fxg such that xRiy, then x = C ( i; R0i).
The following lemma due to Barbera and Peleg will be useful.
Lemma 3 A strategyproof social choice mechanism C with domain  satises the mod-
ied strong positive association property.
9Kim and Roush (1980) say that a domain satises condition FP (rst place) if X = X.
10Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) have proved the equivalence of strategyproofness and strong positive
association over the universal domain of complete orders. The modied positive association property is
necessary but not su¢ cient in general for strategyproofness. Tanaka (2002) exhibits an association property
which is both necessary and su¢ cient on the domain of continuous preferences.
8
The notion of strategyproofness describes individual incentives to report the truth. The
next notion deals with the behavior of coalitions11.
Denition 5 A social choice mechanism C with domain  is manipulable by coalition
S at prole  if there exists 0 2  such that C  0S; NnSPiC() for all i 2 S. A social
choice mechanism C with domain  is coalitional strategyproof if there is no coalition S and
no prole  2  such that C is manipulable by S at .
Coalitional strategy proofness is obviously more demanding than strategyproofness. It
requires that there are no protable deviations from reporting the truth not only by indi-
viduals but also by groups of individuals. This property is rather demanding as it does not
impose to the deviating coalition to be credible.
We conclude this section with an important notion that will be used in subsequent proofs
and a technical lemma. Given a social choice mechanism C with domainDn, a prole  2 Dn
and a coalition S  N , we denote by CS

NnS

the social choice mechanism dened over
the subsociety S with domain DS by :
CS

NnS

(0S) = C
 
0S; NnS

for all 0S 2 DS
The range of the mechanism CS

NnS

will be denoted AS

NnS

: it describes the set
of alternatives (options) attainable by coalition S given the subprole

NnS

of reports by
individuals outside coalition S. These sets , called option sets by Barbera and Peleg (1990)12
will play a critical role in the rest of the paper. For all i 2 N and  2 Dn, the option set of
coalition fig will be denoted Ai [ i].
Lemma 4 Let X be a metric space and D be a subset of the set of continuous preferences
over X . If C is a strategyproof social choice mechanism with domain Dn then for all
 2 Dn and all S  N , AS

NnS
 \X is a closed subset of X.
Proof : Let  2 Dn, S  N and x 2 XnAS

NnS

. We claim that there exists " > 0
such that :
B(x; ") \ AS

NnS

= ?
where denotes the open ball centered on x with radius " i.e. B(x; ") = fy 2 X : d(x; y) < "g13.
Suppose on the contrary that for all " > 0, there exists z" 2 B(x; ") \ X such that z" 2
AS

NnS

. Since x 2 X, there exists R 2 D such that R 2 Dx. Let 0  (R; R; :::; R)
11We call coalition any non empty subset of individuals.
12This technique has been pionnered by La¤ond (1980).
13d denotes the distance attached to the metric space.
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y  C  0S; NnS. Since y 6= x and R 2 Dx we deduce : xP y . Since preferences are con-
tinuous, we deduce that there exists  > 0 such that for all z in the ball B(x; ) : zP y. Select
such a " > 0 smaller than  and R" 2 D such that such R" 2 Dz". Let "  (R"; R"; :::; R")
and
w = C("S; NnS)
Since z" 2 AS

NnS

, we deduce from lemma 1 that w = z".
Without loss of generality, let S  f1; :::::; sg where s  #S14 and consider the nite
sequence of proles
 ej
0js dened as follows :
eRji 
8<:
Ri for all i =2 S
R" for all i 2 f1; ::::::; jg
R for all i 2 fj + 1; ::::::; sg
Since C is strategyproof, we deduce :
C(ejS; NnS)RC(ej+1S ; NnS) for all j = 0; :::; s  1
Since C(e0S; NnS) = y and C(esS; NnS) = w = z", we deduce from above and transitivity
of R that yRz", a contradiction to z"P y 
3 Rich Domains
In the preceding section, we have introduced two notions of strategyproofness. Individual
strategyproofness takes into consideration protable dishonest reports by individuals while
coalitional strategyproofness extends the requirement to all coalitional dishonest joint re-
ports. As already pointed out, the two notions are nested : coalitional strategyproofness is
more demanding than strategyprofness. It is not di¢ cult to produce environments for which
it is strictly more demanding. The purpose of this section is to identify a class of social
environments for which the two notions coincide. Precisely, we introduce a condition on the
domain D of preferences which is su¢ cient for this equivalence to hold true. This class of
domains, that we call rich domains hereafter, is dened as follows.
Denition 6 A domain  = Dn is rich if for all R 2 D and x; y 2 X such that yPx
and y 2 X, there exists R0 2 D such that R0 2 Dy and for all z 6= x such that xRz, we
have xP 0z.
14#S denotes the cardinality of the set S.
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The notion of richness which is stated in denition 6 is designed to take advantage of the
property of modied positive association. Without such domain condition, the property is
vacuous as it cannot be used if it is never the case that two proles are related as described
by the premises of the condition.
To be rich, a domain must contain enough preferences. Of course, the universal domain
is rich but there are also many restricted domains which meet this richness requirement.
Intuitively, when a domain is rich we are able to consider transformations of individual pref-
erences where the positions of two given alternatives are improved in the process. Precisely
the alternative y which was best among the two is now best among all and the other one
x still strictly dominates the alternatives that it was strictly dominating before but now x
also strictly dominates the alternatives belonging to its former indi¤erence curve. This is
illustrated on gures 1 and 2 in the case where alternatives are vectors in the two dimen-
sional Euclidean space. On gure 1, we have drawn the upper contour sets of x and y for
the preference R. On gure 2, we have reproduced the upper contour set of x for R and
drawn, as a dotted curve, the upper countour set of x for R0. The upper contour set of y for
R0 consists exclusively of y.
Figure 1
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Figure 2
It should be transparent from this illustration that for a domain to be rich, we must have
enough degrees of freedom to deform preferences. If not, the richness condition is likely to
be violated. Consider for instance the traditionnal Euclidean environment popular in formal
political science i.e. the setting where X is some Euclidean space <m and D is the subset of
Euclidean preferences : a preference R over X is Euclidean if there exists p 2 <m such that
xRy i¤ k x  p kk y  p k. The upper contours sets are the spheres centered on p. The set
of Euclidean preferences is not rich. To see why, consider the case where m = 2. On gure
3, we have drawn the upper contour set of x with y inside but di¤erent from p. As we can
see immediately, necessarily, the circle centered on y and containing x; has points outside
the rst disk.
Figure 3
We will see sevral important examples of rich domains in the next section. In addition to
these environments, we can also prove15 that the set of continuous preferences over a metric
15A proof is available upon request from the authors.
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xy
space considered by Barbera and Peleg (1990) is rich. Before illustrating richness through
a sample of other domains, it is important to call the attention on the fact that there are
general properties of preferences which preclude the richness condition. For instance, if D
is a subset of the set of separable preferences over a Cartesian set of alternatives16, then D
cannot be rich. To see why, consider the specic case17 where X = <2 and D is the subset
of separable preferences with single peaked marginal preferences as dened by Barbera, Gul
and Stachetti (1993) and Border and Jordan (1983): The domain D contains preferences R
such that p is best, yPx and xPz where the respective positions of p, x and y and z are
represented on gure 4. The key features of this pattern are that y does not belong to the
rectangle generated by x and p and that z belongs to the rectangle generated by x and y.
From the denition of D, it follows that any preference R0 2 D such that y is on top for
R0 implies that any alternatives w in the rectangle generated by x and y is prefered to x
according to R0. In particular, we have zR0x.
Figure 4
16Intuitively, a preference over a product space is separable if preferences over each factor of the product
are dened without ambiguity. Such well dened projections are then called marginal preferences.
17A similar conclusion holds true for the domain of continuous and separable preferences considered by Le
Breton and Weymark (1999).
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This list of examples shows that the richness condition calls for enough exibility in
order to distort a preference in the desired direction. Another illustration of that necessity
is provided by the set Q of quadratic preferences considered by Border and Jordan (1983)
dened in the case where X is some Euclidean space <m. A preference R is quadratic if
there exists p 2 <m and a symmetric and positive denite matrix A = (aij)1i;jm such that
xRy i¤18 (x  p)tA (x  p)  (y   p)tA (y   p). The set of euclidean preferences considered
earlier is a subset corresponding to the case where A is the identity matrix. Border and
Jordan prove that when D = Q, if C is strategyproof and onto, then C is dictatorial. The
set D is not rich. Upper countour sets are now ellipses whose axis can be chosen arbitrarily
but this gain in exibility is not enough to obtain richness. For instance, if we consider
a situation like the one depicted on gure 3, then any ellipse centered on y and passing
through x will have the property that the symmetric image of x through y on the ellipse will
be outside the original circle if y is distant enough from x.
In evaluating the scope of validity of the richnesscondition, it is tempting to infer from the
above examples that any "very small" domain of preferences is likely to violate the condition
of richness; in these examples, preferences are described by a nite number of parameters
and this is too much restrictive to reach the desired exibility. Here is an example of domain
18For any z 2 <m, zt denotes the transpose of z.
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disproving this suspicion; in particular the domain has no free triples19. Consider the case
where X = fx1; x2; :::; xmg is a nite set of m points and let Dcyclic be the domain consisting
of them strict orders x1x2::::xm; x2x3:::x1;...., xmx1:::xm 1. This is a very small domain since
a preference is fully described by its peak. It is however rich. Indeed, consider a preference
P in Dcyclic and x; y 2 X such that yPx. We want to construct a preference bP with y on
top of bP and such that xPz implies x bPz. If y is already in top of P we are done. If not,
then let u be the top of P . Given the denition of Dcyclic, y is somewhere betwwen u and
x for the linear order P . If we lift up the entire linear order P until y reaches the top,
we obtain a linear order bP where some of the alternatives which were ahead of x are now
below x but all alternatives which were below x are still below it for the new order. Kim
and Roush (1980) have demonstrated that if a domain D contains Dcyclic, then there exists
a nondictatorial strategyproof social choice mechanism with domain Dn i¤ there exists a
nondictatorial strategyproof social choice mechanism with domain D2. They provide also a
beautiful characterization of the class of onto strategyproof social choice mechanisms over
D2. This family contains very nice nondictatorial mechanisms. To provide an intuitive
description ot his class, it is useful to interpret the preferences in D as the preferences of
individuals for locations over the unit circle where, given his/her own location, an individual
always prefer a location that is closer to his/her own when travelling always takes place in
a clockwise direction around the circle (an one way road). They demonstrate that any 2-
person strategyproof mechanism C is described by a list of integers fcjg1jm in f1; 2; :::;mg
satisfying cj  cj+1 + 1 and cm  c1 + 1, such that :
C(ai; aj) =

aj if i  j  i+ ci   1 (mod m)
ai otherwise
Kim and Roush also shows that if the domain Dcyclic is enlarged to contain in addition
the following m strict orders x1xm::::x2; x2x1:::x3;...., xmxm 1:::x1, then any strategyproof
social choice mechanism with a range containing at least three alternatives is dictatorial.
By construction, the m new preferences are obtained through the repeated application of
the cyclic permutation to the preference x1xm::::x2 instead of the preference x1x2::::xm used
to for the construction of Dcyclic. Therefore we can use the same argument as above to
conclude that this domain is rich. Finally, Kim and Roush have also been able to prove that
for any integerm, there exist domains, on which every k-tuple is free, for k =
p
Log m

and
admitting 2-person non dictatorial strategyproof and onto social choice mechanisms which
always pick the peak of one of the two individuals. They o¤er a very elegant constructive
19This question was raised by our referee.
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proof of the domain but we have not examined whether their domain was rich or not. For
the general nite setting, the derivation of a full characterization of the domains of linear
orders for which the properties of strategyproofness and coalitional strategyproofness are
equivalent appears to be a quite challenging combinatorial problem.
The interpretation of Kim and Roushs setting as describing the choice of the location
of a facility on a circle opens the door to many alternative domains of preferences. One
natural domain would consist of all single peaked preferences over the circle (when we can
travel on this circular road clockwise or anticlockwise). Another domain, more restricted,
would consist in preferences consistent with the distance on the circle. It is easy to show
that the rst domain is rich while the second is not. The argument behind the proof of these
two claims is similar to the argument used in the case where the set of locations is segment
instead of a circle. On the other hand, it is has been proved (see e.g. Schummer and Vohra
(2002)) that in contrast to the case of a segment, strategyproofness over a domain of single
peaked preferences over a circle leads to dictatoriality.
Finally, it is important to call the attention on the fact that in the premises of the
denition of a rich domain, we only require the existence of this new "lifted" prole when
y 2 X. If X 6= X, this can make an important di¤erence. To illustrate this point, consider
the case where the set X of alternatives is the unitary m-dimensional unitary simplex :(
x 2 <m+ :
mX
k=1
xk = 1
)
and D is the set of linear preferences: a preference R is linear if there exists a vector
a 2 <m such that xRy i¤ ha; xi  ha; yi. In such a case, it is easy to show that X is
the set of vertices of the simplex. However, the domain is not rich as the denition of
richness demands that if xRz for some z, then xP 0z for the new preference R0. Given
the linearity of indi¤erence countour sets, it is not possible to alter weak preferences into
strict preferences. This domain is important as it represents social choice mechanisms where
chance is used in addition to individual preferences to select a social alternative: the set of
alternatives X is the set of lotteries on a set of m pure alternatives. The property of linearity
for individual preferences is equivalent to the requirement that preferences satisfy the von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. In this setting, pionnered by Gibbard (1977) and further
explored by Barbera (1979a) and others, a lot is known upon the class of strategyproof social
choice mechanisms. Not all them are of course coalitional strategyproof. For instance, when
m = 3 and n = 2, random dictatorship is not coalitional strategyproof : for instance, if
vertices 1 and 2 are the peaks of the two individuals and vertex 3 is their common second
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choice, then reporting the truth is not an optimal strategy if their intensity for the second
choice is large enough. Barbera (1979b) provides a description of the class of those which
were coalitional strategy proof in that class.
Our main result on rich domains is the following.
Theorem 1 Let C be a social choice mechanism with domain  = Dn. If D is rich,
then C is strategyproof if and only if C is coalitional strategyproof.
Proof : Let C be a strategyproof social choice mechanism on a domain Dn assumed to
be rich. We now prove that C is coalitional strategyproof. assume on the contrary that C
is not coalitional strategyproof. Then, there exists S  N and ; 0 2 Dn such that for all
i 2 S :
y  C(0S; NnS)PiC()  x
Since D is rich, there exists 00 2 Dn such that for all i 2 S :
R00i 2 Dy and for all z 6= x : xRiz ) xP 00i z
and for all i =2 S :
R00i = Ri
Given the construction of 00 and since C() = x, a repeated application of lemma 3
leads to :
C(00) = x (1)
On the other hand, note that since C is strategyproof, the restricted social choice mech-
anism CS

NnS

= CS
h
00NnS
i
is also strategyproof. Since x 2 AS
h
00NnS
i
and R00i 2 Dy for
all i 2 S, we deduce from lemma 1 that CS
h
00NnS
i
(00S) = C(
00) = y in contradiction to (1)
While less important, there are also some other implications of the richness condition
that we would like to report as they will be used as auxilliary results in the next section.
Denition 7 A social choice mechanism C with domain Dn is dictatorial if there exists
an individual i 2 N such that for all  2 Dn and all x; y 2 C(), if xPiy, then C() 6= y.
A dictatorial social choice mechanism ignores the preferences of all but one individual
: the most preferred alternative of this individual, called the dictator, is selected to be the
social outcome.
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Lemma 5 Let C be a regular and strategyproof social choice mechanism with domain
 = Dn. If D is rich, then C is dictatorial if and only C  is dictatorial.
Proof : Assume that C is dictatorial and let us prove that C is dictatorial too. Let i be
the dictator for C and assume on the contrary that i is not a dictator for C. Then there
exist  2 Dn and x; y 2 C() such that C() = x and yPix. Since D is rich, there exists
R0i 2 D such that :
R0i 2 Dy and for all z 6= x : xRiz ) xP 0iz
Further, since C is regular, for all j 2 Nn fig, there exists R0j such that :
R0j 2 Dx
A repeated application of lemma 3 leads to C(0) = x. But, on the other hand, since
C(0) = C(0) and i is a dictator for C, we deduce that C(0) = y in contradiction to the
earlier statement 
4 Applications
The main purpose of this section is to illustrate the usefulness of theorem 1 though a detailed
examination of a specic but important environment. When a domain of preferences  is
rich, the analysis of the implications of strategyproofness in the construction of social choice
mechanisms is considerably simplied as we know that the mechanism is in fact coalitional
strategyproof. Note in particular that if a mechanism C is coalitional strategyproof, then it is
Pareto e¢ cient over the range C() i.e. there does not exist  2  and x 2 C() : xPiC()
for all i 2 N .
Since Pareto E¢ ciency put some constraints on the subset of social outcomes that may
be considered, this information can be exploited to simplify the analysis of the mechanism
C.
4.1 Allocation of a Budget Across Several Di¤erent Pure Public
Goods
The allocation environment considered in this section has been examined rst by Zhou (1991)
and is dened as follows. An exogeneous monetary budget of size normalized to 1 is to be
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allocated across m di¤erent pure public goods. The set X of alternatives is therefore the
unitary m-dimensional unitary simplex :(
x 2 <m+ :
mX
k=1
xk = 1
)
We assume that each individual i 2 N has a preference over the m-dimensional positive
orthant <m+ which is assumed to be strictly monotonic and strictly convex. The set D is
the set of restrictions of such preferences to the set X. It is straightforward to show that
a preference R is in D i¤ its upper contour sets are strictly convex. Theorem 3 stated
below holds true for all n and all m  3 but for the sake of simplicity, we will limit our
investigation to the case where m = 3 and n = 2. The case where m = 2 is considered in
the next subsection.
Lemma 6 Let m = 3 and n = 2. Then the set D of preferences with strictly convex
upper contour sets is rich.
Proof : Let R be a preference in D such that yPx for some x; y 2 X. Let A be the upper
contour set of x with respect to R i.e.
A = fz 2 X : zRxg
A is a closed and strictly convex subset of X with y 2 Interior A. Let A0 be a closed
and convex subset of A such that y 2 Interior A0 and Boundary A \ Boundary A0 = fxg.
The construction of such subset is illustrated on gure 520. The set A0 as depicted is not
strictly convex. To get a strict convex set A00 contained in A0 and containing y, consider
the line orthogonal to [y0; x] and passing through x+y
0
2
. If we consider two circles centered
respectively in t and u, located on this line, on both sides of the segment [y0; x] and with
radius kx  tk = kx  uk, then the intersection(s) of the circle(s) with either the half plane
above or the half plane below the segment [y0; x] are contained in A0 if kx  tk is large
enough. Since by construction this subset is strictly convex, the argument is complete. The
construction of A00 is illustrated on gure 6.
Let J be the jauge of (A00   fyg) with respect to y i.e. the function dened by :
J(w) = Inf 
w y2(A00 fyg)
20The general existence of A0 follows from the following argument. Since y 2 Interior A , there exists " > 0
such that B(y; ")  A. The set A0 dened as the convex hull of B(y; ") and x satises the desired conditions.
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It is well known21 that J is a continuous and convex (here strictly convex) function such
that :
J(w) = 1 i¤ w 2 Boundary A00
Let R0 be the preference generated by  J . By construction, R0 2 Dy and for all z 6= x,
xRz implies xP 0z 
Figure 5
Figure 6
Lemma 7 Let m = 3 and n = 2. Let C be a strategyproof social choice mechanism over
D such that C(Dn) = X. Then, for all x 2 X and all R1; R01 2 Dx, A2(R1) = A2(R01):
Proof : Assume on the contrary that there exists z 2 A2(R1) such that z =2 A2(R01). We
construct a preference R2 as follows. On one hand, since from lemma 4, A2(R01) is closed,
21See e.g. Rockafellar (1970).
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x
there exists a ball B(z; ") where " > 0 such that B(z; ") \ A2(R01) = ?. On the other hand,
from lemma 1, we deduce that x 2 A2(R01). Let :
w  Boundary B(z; ") \ [x; z] 22
Since R1 is strictly convex : wP1z. Since R1 is continuous, we deduce therefore that there
exists a ball B(w; ) where "
2
>  > 0 such that for all u 2 B(w; ) : uP1z. Let fu0; u00g 
Boundary B(z; ")\ Boundary B(w; ). Consider the two half- lines with origin x and going
respectively through u0 and u00 and the convex set S as on gure 723.
Figure 7
Proceeding as in the proof of lemma 6, let H be dened over X as the jauge of S with
respect to z and R2 be the preference generated by H. We deduce that R2 is strictly convex.
23As pointed out by the referee, the set S, as depicted, is not strictly convex. To get a strict convex set
contained in S and containing z, we can proceed as in the proof of lemma 6. Consider the line orthogonal
to [z0; x] and passing through x+z
0
2 . If we consider a circle centered in a point t located on this line and
with radius kx  tk, then the intersection(s) of the circle(s) with either the half plane above or the half
plane below the segment [z0; x] are contained in S. Since by construction this subset is strictly convex, the
argument is complete.
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z
w
'u s
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Further, z is the unique best element and the boundary of S is the indi¤erence curve going
through x.
Since, by assumption, z 2 A2(R1), there exists R02 2 D such that z = C(R1; R02). Since
C is strategyproof, we deduce therefore that :
C(R1; R2) = z (2)
Now, let B be the set24 of best alternatives of R2 over A2(R01). By construction of B(z; "),
B \ B(z; ") = ?. Also, by construction of S and since x 2 A2(R01) : B  S. Further, since
C is strategyproof, we deduce therefore that there exist b 2 B such that :
C(R01; R2) = b (3)
From the construction of S and the position of b in S, we deduce from the strict convexity
of R1 that bP1z. Indeed, b is necessarily such that b = v + (1  )x for some  2 [0; 1]
and v 2 B(w; ). Therefore, since vP1z and xP1z, we deduce from the strict convexity of
R1 that bP1z. Comparing (2) and (3), this implies then that C is manipulable by individ-
24Since the set A2(R01) is compact, the set B is nonempty. Note however, that,since A2(R
0
1) is not
necessarily convex, the set B may contain more than one alternative.
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ual 1 at the prole  = (R1; R2) in contradiction to our assumption that C is strategyproof 
We are now in position to prove the main result of this section. To proceed, we will
use a result proved by Bordes, La¤ond and le Breton (1990) for the domain of Euclidean
preferences over X. Let bD be the subset of Euclidean preferences over <2 such that their
ideal point belongs to X. Without any risk of confusion, we identify bD with X.
Theorem 2 Let m = 3 and n = 2. Let C be a coalitional strategyproof social choice
mechanism over bD such that C( bDn) = X. Then, C is dictatorial.
Theorem 3 Let m = 3 and n = 2. Let C be a strategyproof social choice mechanism
over D such that C(Dn) = X. Then, C is dictatorial.
Proof : From lemma 7, D is rich and therefore, from theorem 1, C is coalitional strate-
gyproof. Let bC be the restriction of C to bDn. Then, bC is also coalitional strategyproof. We
deduce from theorem 2 that bC is dictatorial. Without loss of generality, let individual 1 be
the dictator for bC. We now prove that 1 is also a dictator for C. This is equivalent to show
that for all  2 D2, the option set A2(R1) is equal to the unique best element of R1.
Let :
bA2(R1)  nx 2 X : x = C(R1; R2) for some R2 2 bDo
From lemma 3, we deduce that if z = C(R1; R2), then z = C(R1; R02) where R
0
2 2 bDz.
From lemma 6, bA2(R1) = A2(x1) where x1 denotes both the best alternative for R1 and the
Euclidean preference with ideal point R1. By combining both claims, we obtain that :
A2(R1) = A2(x1) = bA2(x1)
But, since 1 is a dictator for C, bA2(x1) = fx1g and the conclusion follows 
4.2 Single Peakedness
Theorem 3 was derived under the assumption that there are at least three di¤erent public
goods. When there are only two public goods, the set X is an interval. A preference
in D over that interval is single peaked. We know that for this social environment there
are many non dictatorial strategyproof social choice mechanisms, on top of which the so
called median mechanism. The general family of strategyproof social choice mechanisms
has been characterized by Moulin (1980). The domain D is rich and a shorter proof of the
characterization result exploiting theorem 1 could be provided. But more importantly, this
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setting is interesting as it illustrates the fact that there are domains where individual and
coalitional strategyproofness are equivalent without being equivalent to dictatoriality.
In fact, the richness property continues to hold in the case where single peakedness is
dened with respect to an arbitrary tree instead of a segment, as in Demange (1982). The
class of strategyproof social choice mechanisms operating over such a larger domain D of
singlepeaked preferences has been characterized by Danilov (1994). Since D is rich, we
deduce from theorem 1 that these mechanisms are coalitional strategyproof. A direct proof
of that assertion is provided by Danilov.
4.3 Piecewise Linear Preferences
Theorem 3 can be extended to domains larger than D. Since here X = X, any social
choice mechanism is trivially regular. From lemma 4, we deduce that C is dictatorial i¤ C
is dictatorial. Therefore, it is enough to prove that C is dictatorial. To do so, it is useful
to observe again that in the proof of lemma 6, we do not exploit the full force of the strict
convexity of R1:What is truly needed is the strict monotonicity along any half-line with the
best alternative x1 as origin, a property called star-shapedness by Border and Jordan (1983).
The structure of the proof of theorem 3 is quite instructive. Once we know that the
social choice mechanism C is coalitional strategyproof, we can exploit the simple fact that
any restriction of C to a subdomain is also coalitional strategyproof. On these subdomains,
the geometry of the Pareto set is sometimes easy to derive. For instance, in the case where
the subdomain consists of the subset of Euclidean preferences, the Pareto set is the convex
hull of the ideal points of the two individuals. The proof of theorem 2 based on the technique
of option sets uses this property. Once we know what happens on a subdomain, it remains
of course to extend the result to the all domain. The key step25, which corresponds here to
lemma 7, is a "top only" property asserting that strategyproofness implies that only the top
alternatives of the two individuals matter in calculating the social outcome.
Theorem 3 is a slightly weaker version of an impossibility result established for this
environment by Zhou (1991). His setting is identical to the one considered here but instead
of us, Zhou does not assume that the range of the mechanism C coincides with X and
demonstrates his result under the weaker assumption that the range of C is two dimensional.
To illustrate the usefulness of this method, we present a variant of the technique developed
in the preceding section and derive a new result. Once again, after a proof that the domain
we are going to consider is rich, it takes advantage of existing results on strategyproofness
25This "tops only" property is a familiar cornerstone in this area.
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on a subdomain of that domain. Within the public good setting described in the preceding
section, we consider now the set D of piecewise linear preferences over X. A preference R
is piecewiselinear if there exists a nite set of vectors a1; a2; :::::; aK 2 <m such that for all
x; y 2 X :
xRy i¤Min
 

a1; x

; :::::;


aK ; x
 Min  
a1; y ; :::::; 
aK ; y
It can be veried that the domain D is rich. A proof similar to the proof used in the
preceding section and based on the jauge function can be o¤ered. An illustration of the
argument behind this assertion is provided on gure 7.
Figure 7
Let C be strategyproof social choice mechanism over Dn. Since D is rich, we deduce
from theorem 1 that it is coalitional strategyproof. This implies that its restriction bC to the
subdomain of linear preferences is also coalitional strategyproof. From the results of Barbera
and Gibbard, to which we already alluded, we deduce that bC is dictatorial. It remains to
prove that C itself is dictatorial. To do so, it is enough to have a top only property similar
to the one stated in lemma 7 in the case of the preceding domain. We leave to the reader
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to check that a statement analogous to lemma 7 holds true here: as already pointed out, a
close look at the argument used in the proof shows that we do not exploit the full force of
strict convexity.
We could produce much more results along the same lines. For instance, within the class
of piecewise linear preferences, we could limit ourselves to the subclass of those for which K
(the number of linear forms in the denition of the preference) is bounded by some exogenous
integer. This bound has of course implications on the shape of upper countour sets. It is
interesting to observe that when K = 2 and m = 3, the set X coincides with the boundary
of the simplex. Once again the proof can be adjusted to deal with this domain which is a
subdomain of the domain of convex preferences but a superdomain of the domain of linear
preferences.
Much more illustrations could be provided. It is straightforward to see that the conclu-
sion of theorem 3 holds true for the social environment where X = <2+ and D is the set of
preferences with compact and strictly convex upper contour sets. However, within this carte-
sian setting, this conclusion does not hold true when preferences are further restricted to be
separablef. In fact, as demonstrated by Le Breton and Sen (1999) when a domain D consists
of separable preferences over a product set, strategyproofness implies decomposability. The
class of decomposable strategyproof social choice mechanisms contains non dictatorial mech-
nisms. However, these mechanisms are not Pareto e¢ cient. If we insist on Pareto e¢ ciency,
then the class of strategyproof social choice mechanisms collapses on dictatorial mechanisms.
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